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As Fudge goes on: Thus by giving animals a face, by individuating them as subjects, they can be reincluded in the fold of humanity. But for Buller, in contrast to Fudge, giving an animal a humanized face is a part of the problem.

His analysis of the industrialization of animal farming and the problems emerging from the ever greater number of animals kept for food production Fraser, is linked to the rise of the public concern for the welfare of farmed animals and the development of animal welfare science. He points out how this approach, that is met with favour by the public see Miele, , is too individuating.

The subject-object divide that lies at the heart of much humanism is of course not peculiar to science. Its origins lie more in a grammatical division in language between subject, which does the doing, and object, to which things are done, including observation, experimentation and measurement.

This point needs some further comment. In an enslavement to their instruments and their tried and tested protocols, scientists are bound by their conventions to go with the measurements: As such they can no longer stand for nature.

Elsewhere in her study of genetic medicine Latimer a explores this motility in the subject-object divide. Yet as Candea this issue helps remind us, through further switches in ground the objects of science are not the materials and creatures that the scientists employ and study in their experiments. What he shows is how the instruments, the meerkats, also have to become participants for the experiment. In this way the mode of detachment takes the subject-object division one step further than is usually noted.

Towards a More Inclusive Science The shift in philosophy of science with which the papers that follow are engaged is thus not just about bringing the animal and the non-human alongside class, race, and gender to help reorder sociology, philosophy and social theory. In this sense, what is happening here is to do with a politics of imagination Latimer and Skeggs, Rather, for social scientists and philosophers of science such as Despret, Stengers and Haraway, engagement with the process of science is a matter of activism: This is not just to admit the contingent, historical, interested and localized rather than universal or logical character of science, as if it holds to absolute moral values of freedom, objectivity, disinterest, rationality and progress — limited, and bounded by time, space and culture Cunningham and Williams, This is because science is a site of crossing: It is also about unconcealing how good science is done.

It is thus in this sense that the papers here contribute to a radical move in the philosophy of science: References Adam B Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards. Agamben G The Open: Alger JM Drawing the line. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 23 3: Anderson K Social Nature. Latimer and Miele 27 Bauman Z Effacing the face: On the social management of moral proximity.

Bell V Declining performativity: Butler, Whitehead and ecologies of concern. Blackman L and Cromby J eds Editorial: Braidotti R Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Braidotti R The Posthuman. Buller H Individuation, the mass and farm animals. Callon M Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? Candea M Habituating meerkats and redescribing animal behaviour science.

Carter B and Charles N a Human-animal connections: Carter B and Charles N b Power, agency and a different future. The British Journal for the History of Science 26 4: Davies G Mobilizing experimental life: Spaces of becoming with mutant mice. Derrida J Writing and Difference, trans. Despret V Que diraient les animaux si. Les empecheurs de penser en rond. Despret V Responding bodies and partial affinities in human-animal worlds. Duncan I A concept of welfare based on feelings. Foucault M What is Enlightenment?

Foucault M [] The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. Fudge E Animal. Fudge E The animal face of early modern England. Gane N and Haraway D When we have never been human, what is to be done?

Haraway D When Species Meet. University of Minnesota Press. Heidegger M The question concerning technology.

Basic Writings, revised and expanded edition. Ingold T Key Debates in Anthropology. London and New York: Quasi-actants, virtual theory, and the new empiricism of Bruno Latour.

The Sociological Review 59 1: Kruse CR Social animals: Animal studies and sociology. Society and Animals 10 4: Latimer J The dark at the bottom of the stair: Participation and performance of older people in hospital. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 13 2: Diagnosing Dysmorphology, Reviving Medical Dominance. Rethinking relations amongst different kinds.

Latimer J and Birke L Natural relations: Horses, knowledge and technology. The Sociological Review 57 1: Everyday shifts of care in biogerontology.

Latimer J and Skeggs B The politics of imagination: Keeping open and critical. Latour B To modernize or to ecologize? Nature at the Millennium. Latour B The Politics of Nature: How to Bring Sciences into Democracy.

Latour B Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor Network Theory. New Literary History 41 3: Sociological Review Monograph 58 s2: From Society to Heterogeneity. Midgeley M Bridge-building at last. Miele M The taste of happiness: Environment and Planning A 43 9: Mowat F [] Never Cry Wolf.

Munro R The consumption view of self: Extension, exchange and identity. Munro R and Belova O The body in time: Liminal practices in science. Pattberg P Conquest, domination and control: Journal of Political Ecology Popper K Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.

Puig de la Bellacasa M Matters of care in technoscience: Social Studies of Science 41 1: The Sociological Review 60 2: Rabinow P Artificiality and enlightenment: From sociobiology to biosociality. Crary J and Kwinter S eds Incorporations. Ruddick S The politics of affect: Spinoza in the work of Negri and Deleuze. Seaman MJ Becoming more than human: Affective posthumanisms, past and future. Journal of Narrative Theory 37 2: Spinoza B de A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, trans.

Stengers I Cosmopolitics I, trans. Strathern M No nature, no culture: Cambridge University Press, pp. Strathern M Partial Connections. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 2 3: Strathern M Prefigured features: A view from the New Guinea Highlands. The Australian Journal of Anthropology 8 2: Teubner G Rights of non-humans? Electronic agents and animals as new actors in politics and law. Thompson C Making Parents: The Ontological Choreography of Reproductive Technologies.

Thompson C forthcoming Good Science: Thrift N Non-representational Theory: Twine R Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability and Critical Animal Studies. The nature-culture divide in climate change and biodiversity policy. Venn C Individuation, relationality, affect: Rethinking the human in relation to the living. The Sociological Review 59 3: Whatmore S Earthly powers: Wolfe C What Is Posthumanism?

Woolgar S and Lezaun J The wrong bin bag: A turn to ontology in science and technology studies? Social Studies of Science 43 3: Her current studies press divisions between nature and culture, human and non-human, death and life, the normal and the pathological, including an ongoing ethnography of ageing and biology.

Article Earthly Powers and Affective Environments: I work these arguments through the demanding experimental ethos of the philosopher Isabelle Stengers, for whom scientific practices produce reliable knowledge claims only in so far as the questions they address are at risk of being redefined by the phenomena mobilized in them, and who extends this ethos to elaborate an understanding of, even a test for, an adequate political theory and practice.

I do so with reference to a recent research experiment in which I collaborated with social and natural scientists and people affected by flooding in the UK. Keywords affective environments, experimental constructivism, posthumanism. It is not enough to decide to include nonhumans in collectives or to acknowledge that societies live in a physical and biological world as useful as these steps may be.

The crucial point is to learn how Corresponding author: In this article I set out to explore the political promise of posthumanism, as a project that insists on the co-evolutionary embodiment and embeddedness of the human animal with the world Wolfe, As a geographer, I gravitate towards the rich conjunction of the bio life and the geo earth — or what the writer Jeanette Winterson In these terms, it is a mistake to posit humanity culture as somehow existing apart from the world of things nature ; rather, the human comes into being with this world.

Each of these facets of objectivity relies in turn upon a third, an experimental apparatus that mediates their relationship in a way that can be replicated. More radically, Stengers extends this ethos Whatmore 39 of experimentation to elaborate an understanding of, even a test for, an adequate political theory and practice see also Disch, Experimenting Political Practice If we take seriously those nonhumans that are best characterised as forcing thought.

Such situations, matters or forces render expert knowledge claims, and the technologies through which these become hardwired into the working practices of commerce and government, the subject of intense political interrogation. Their account of the political potency of knowledge controversies relies on two departures from the conventions of democratic political theory. The second departure is to redress the endemic humanism of political theory by recognizing that such emergent publics are not exclusively human achievements.

These activities were further supported by a password-restricted website hosting a resource depository for materials generated by group members e. This activity also helped to dissociate the university members from the normal networks constitutive of their authority and highlighted the ways in which all knowledge claims rely on the witness of objects. As one of the oldest local members of the group, recalling her girlhood in the town, observed: On the one hand: They are not actual measurements of where the water actually goes.

The point of the exercise, as one of the local members put it afterwards, was to get a feel for the: The ensuing discussion gelled into a decision to give our research collaboration a public face — the Ryedale Flood Research Group RFRG that, from this point on, began to overtake the methodological principles that had guided its initiation. So if you have got half the size of gutter, it comes over the top more quickly.

Going public took the form of an exhibition in Pickering Civic Centre. The event was advertised in the local press and held on a Tuesday in October , a few months after the group had ceased to meet regularly. In such moments the ontological settlement that divides the social from the natural, and which expert environmental management practices assume and perpetuate, loses its grip.

The series of small bunds made out of vernacular materials that the RFRG proposed are even now being constructed in the upper catchment of Pickering Beck and Ryedale. I have tried to give some sense of the diversity of scholarship exploring this ontopolitical tack — in STS, political theory, anthropology and geography, among others.

Rather, it is also one that we might wish still to call ideological. The question we have to ask ourselves [he argues] is not whether we have accurately represented some pre-existing phenomena or entity but whether there is now a distance between the new repertoire of actions and the repertoire with which we started.

In this, it differs from the usage we later came across in medical and legal circles in which competency groups refer to gatherings of professional practitioners of specialist branches of medicine or law. Man and Animal, trans. The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze. Posthumanism and the Other Within.

Governing a Technological Society. A Political Ecology of Things. Whatmore 49 Braun, B. Technoscience, Democracy and Public Life. University of Minnesota Press, ix—xl. Economic externalities revisited by sociology. The Laws of Markets. Essay on Technological Democracy, trans. First published , Agir dans un monde incertain. Essai sur la democratie technique. Sociable Life on a Dynamic Planet. Ohio State University Press. Experiments in Postvital Living. Biopolitics and Philosophy, trans. Interfaces with New Media.

Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. Free Association Books, — Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Bodies and Machines at Speed.

Law J and Hassard, J. New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture. University of Minnesota Press, — MacArthur E and Paulson W. University of Michigan Press. University of Minnesota Press, 3— Economy and Society 40 4: Her research addresses the interface between cultural geography, political theory and science and technology studies.

Bodies are multiple, as are the practices that involve them: Still others are faced with the question: Keywords animals, bodies, embodied communication, empathy, field practices, partial affinities However important feelings and interpretations may be, they are not alone in making up what life is all about. Sometimes — mostly Corresponding author: An unwritten rule obviously reigns in animal sciences: Compared to this general trend, Konrad Lorenz, the famous Austrian ethologist, appears to be an exception.

Lorenz swam with the geese, acted like a mother with little goose Martina, called and greeted like them — later on he was even courted by some of them: It became a human-body-with-a-goose or a with-a-jackdaw Despret, These experiences are, however, as I noted above, very rare. The fact that the body is rarely mentioned per se because science is the cognitive activity par excellence is, however, not the sole reason for its absence.

Field workers for the most part strive to remain detached, passive in external appearance, unresponsive to overtures. This reduces communication between the two to a minimum. Others spend enormous amounts of time and energy habituating the animal to the presence of the investigator.

Investigators do not often describe how their subjects react to them. One is the observer, the other the observed. How may we hope to seek in the abundant ethological literature the rare moments where the body has mattered so much that mentioning it was worthwhile, if not unavoidable? A brief return to Lorenz might give us some cues. These new approaches bear a resemblance to the theoretical ground upon which Lorenz designed his practice. This insight is well founded, as we shall see, but it is only partially sound.

On the other hand, scientists may engage their body for other motives than perceiving what the animals observe, sense, feel or live: One may indeed construct a perspective without involving the body. According to the Umwelt theory, animals only perceive things that have a meaning for them; things that have no meaning are not perceived. Moreover, the animal construes meanings in acting — a thing taking the meaning of the action that it renders possible — and this very thing therefore exists for this animal.

The paradigmatic example associated with his name is the tick, whose world is composed of only a few phenomena: The searcher is no longer pursuing a semiological query: As Lorraine Daston writes: The language of perspective carries with it weighty assumptions about what it means to understand other minds.

Here, I can only hint at the several intellectual and cultural shifts that created the perspectival mode: The critics have objected to this in two ways. I, for my part, wish to take the other side of the question, though not merely the reverse side: In a word, my question will become: Allow to marinate for about two hours.

Cut belly pork into small cubes and fry slowly until most of the fat has been rendered. Now add a cup of alcohol and six or eight cloves. The cream sauce can be made according to any standard recipe.

The body belonged to a biologist, Farley Mowat, who, at the end of the s, was sent to conduct research on wild wolves in the Arctic. The experiment was about the wolves. Could a diet comprised only of mice be possible anyway? The solution was to follow what the wolves do: Wolves eat the whole mouse. Even if it was the case that this is what Mowat aimed to do, we should notice that he goes further: Grandin became a notorious expert in designing factory plants for humane slaughter systems and she is frequently hired to check meatpacking plants where there are problems.

She argues that in most cases problems are due to unnoticed tiny details that frighten the animals, which in turn resist or balk. Grandin sees these details we do not see, because she sees like animals. She says she thinks the way animals think.

She sees like animals, therefore she may tell people why their animals are doing the things they do. For the animals, as well as for Grandin, the world is a swirling mass of tiny details. This is, however, not what I intend. Still, this is not enough. You have to see in details, like animals do. Because, according to Grandin, animals are visual thinkers.

And so is she. Temple Grandin is autistic: All that means that her empathy actually is a strange empathy, an apparent oxymoron: However, I would suggest that this link is a short-cut to something more complicated. Yes, she transforms her handicap into a gift, which empowers her, as much as she actively transforms mindless animals into meaningful geniuses, which also gives them new powers; but this is not the whole story.

She ends up not being the same. Identity is the outcome, the achievement. It has nothing to do with a romantic unmediated gift; it has to do with Despret 61 years of hard work — and love. Empathy may be innate — or not — but it ought nevertheless to be cultivated, nurtured, educated. Here is the promise of objectivity: This would give us a less problematic version of embodied empathy: Experimental Bodies Back now to Mowat and his wolves, about whom I was drawing the contrast: Why was it so important to experiment with what wolves eat?

In the late s, wolves were hardly known by scientists and actually did not arouse much interest. However, they were the subjects of hot political controversies.

More and more hunters were coming back from more and more hunts with fewer and fewer deer. Some people, however, suspected that there were fewer deer because the hunters had increased to the point where they outnumbered the deer. After some months observing the animals,16 Mowat discovered that when the caribous migrate for the hot season the wolves eat mice. Even if he collected some empirical proof in the feces, these empirical proofs would support only the idea that, sometimes, some wolves eat some mice, not the hypothesis that they survive on them for a good part of the year.

It is not empathy, nor a mere romantic dream of being a wolf — look again at the recipe: It is a technical device. The body is the witness. It will be the experimental group and the control group: At the end of each period, Mowat would run a series of physiological tests and compare the two sets of results.

It is an experiment that leads to something rather unusual: Experiencing or sharing the inner life of a wolf receives here an unusual meaning and rather odd, for us, contemporary western psychological subjects: This is the beginning of a companion story, cum panis, the ones with whom we share food Haraway, The same food, even if not at the same table in this case, and for an experimental aim.

Most ethologists and primatologists are faced with this problem, though they hardly mention it in their reports: I encountered, in my readings, two motives for these worries. The other motive, much rarer, takes the form of cautious politeness: We will come to that point later. Most often animals are simply submitted to human biological constraints. As pharmacologist Michael Chance pointed out, research with rats, for example, is carried out during daytime hours, which is the most convenient time for researchers, though, as it happens, it is the middle of the night for the rats: In better cases, the laboratory at least takes care to apply reverse lighting procedures.

However, in both cases, the animal is the one who adapts or tries to. Wolves are, in this respect, particularly problematic for human scientists. During the day, Mowat remarked, he observed that the female and the pups in the group were active, while the hunters two males rested in short naps of 10 minutes duration.

During the night the males embarked on their own activities. For fear of missing something vital, Mowat prevented himself from sleeping. After a few days, he reached the limits of his endurance. The solution came from the animals: Mowat failed to wake up until several hours had passed. Since his arrival, several weeks earlier, he had encountered the wolves only twice, both times by pure chance.

The second time he saw them, however, they were entering a cave — probably their den, Mowat guesses.

However, the next day when he returned to the site no wolves seemed to actually inhabit this cave. The esker remained deserted. At this critical junction none but the most self-assured of men. To say that I was chagrined to discover I was not alone would be an understatement; for sitting directly behind me, and not twenty yards away, were the missing wolves. Instead of which, outraged, he turned his back on the watching wolves and hurriedly did up his buttons. The problem, he confesses, was that he was facing the question of who is watching whom.

Who is watching whom: Derrida, in that story, says that he realized that his cat, his small female cat, was actually looking back at him one morning in his bathroom. Derrida all the more felt that he was in the presence of someone who was seeing him naked.

The shame of being naked is not about the cat, it is only about himself. And yet for sure, we may have the impression that the naked body is a pretext, a pre-text for more philosophy; a kind of blank screen, all the more so since reciprocal gazes do not lead Derrida to share sensualities — or to write about them — nor to discuss the choreography of the morning greeting ceremony. Politeness The issue of nudity does not seem to be a major preoccupation for the scientists — some of them studying swimming animals in the wild confess, in private, that they mostly work naked.

However, the incident Farley Mowat describes is echoed in the practices of some scientists. The primatologist Shirley Strum mentions it in passing when she describes her daily routine with the baboons she observes.

However, the question she raises has practical, vital, and I would add ethical consequences, for her and for the baboons she works with. But the risk of missing something was worrying her more and more; she decided after a while that she could try to urinate while staying among the baboons. She cautiously undressed, looking around.

They were, she says, astonished by the noise. Nothing made them believe that she could be a baboon. Next time, she concluded, they would not even react. The story Strum tells us is linked to the second question I noted though only rarely in ethological and primatological literature, the polite question: Looking and looking back on this occasion occurs not only in the gaze of those who meet and learn to know each other: Maybe this time we might say that the empathy was on the side of the baboons.

Farley Mowat describes a situation that is apparently very similar. In other words, Mowat used his body to make the animals respond. He decided to pitch his tent near to it in order to observe them, day and night. The wolves completely ignored him.

Actually, wolves were regularly passing by the tent and never evinced the slightest interest in him. Being ignored to such an extent became more and more intolerable for Mowat as time passed. Therefore, Mowat planned to use this knowledge to make them at least recognize his existence. This took most of the night and required, as he meticulously explains, frequent returns to the tent to consume quantities Despret 67 of tea.

As usual, the animal ignored the tent and its human owner, until he passed by a marked bush: After a minute of complete indecision he backed away a few yards and sat down. At this moment, Mowat became very worried: The wolf kept looking at him. Then the wolf slowly began a systematic tour of the area and carefully placed his own mark on each of the ones the human had marked.

In fact, it is not only the conventions of writing that render this unlikely; it is the very codes of practice. Smuts recalls that progress in habituation was painfully slow: Ignoring social cues, she learned, is far from neutral social behaviour. Smuts therefore had to learn to be polite, in the ethical, political, and epistemological senses of the word.

She learned to respond, to acknowledge, to look back, perhaps to greet, as she says. And, as she tells us, her own being was transformed: I was learning a whole new way of being in the world — the way of baboons.

She explains that, having learned the way baboons express their emotions, motivations or intentions, she could respond to them in ways she picked up from them and be understood. Once out of the Land Rover, she observed the way Ray, an immigrant male, made his own approach to enter the troop.

And she imitated him. One day Ray, positioning himself between Strum and two resident males, solicited her support in agonistic interaction with them. Strum refused to cooperate, and she did it in the way the baboons taught her: It is to insist upon the fact that if we are to understand how scientists may talk about their animals and how they make them known, and if we are to elucidate how these animals gain new identities through the very practices, we would be better served if we told stories about these embodied encounters.

As Annemarie Mol calls it: Bodies enact rather than perform as Mol also suggests , and considering them as enacting blurs the clear-cut divide between knowing subject and known object: This is not only an epistemological issue, it is a political one and an ontological one.

In attending to a praxiographic account of their work, and moreover through paying attention to the way they embody their work, I hope, for my part, that my own account has made these scientists more real, without diminishing or obscuring the reality of the animals that actively participate in the research process. Empathy is a word that is very often recruited in these kinds of stories, especially when bodies are involved.

It bears resonances with troublesome romantic meanings, magic or folk knowledge. Nevertheless, I choose to keep it, but only as a tool, in order to give it other meanings, to complicate the situations where this word may be evoked. Empathy becomes multiple, as are bodies, as are encounters, as are animals who are the living actors of these encounters. Bodies are articulating, and become articulated, in the asking and in its responses. To urinate in front of an animal may create what Anna Tsing calls frictions.

It matters for them that it matters for their animals. Empathy, in this case, is not feeling what the other feels, it is rather making the body available for the response of another being. It is to make ourselves and them corresponding, in all the senses my Oxford dictionary gives: The empathy is not the same. For their purpose is not alike either. She is neither trying to get knowledge — knowing for the sake of knowing — nor trying to get involved in the life of the animals she tries to identify with.

An emotion, according to James, is not what is felt, but what makes us feel. In other words, our feelings dispose our bodies, our bodies dispose our feelings. The actors, James says, all know this simple fact: He quotes psychologist Fechner: When the baboons gave dirty looks to the former, she had to learn to act with them, to leave room for them to resist her proposition or her presence. Acting with them is not the result but the very condition of acting like them.

Empathy makes us think with, and with the body. A last thought, to conclude: It is never given, even if it is a gift. But authenticity is not lost: Acknowledgements I am grateful to my colleague John Pearson for revising the last version of the manuscript and for his suggestions. I also wish to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments, sound critiques, and warm encouragements.

However true this may be, these kind of complaints are a loi du genre, whose aim is to claim that you can only suffer these hardships if you really love animals.

I could recall here the famous Clever Hans, the German horse that performed extraordinary feats among others, Hans could solve arithmetical problems to which he gave the answer by knocking with his feet.

See Bernd Heinrich for the ravens, Zahavi and Zahavi for the babblers, Cynthia Moss for the elephants, and Thelma Rowell for the sheep — many others could be mentioned. Bruno Latour inspires much of my work dealing with scientists working with animals. For an example in the field of ethology and primatology see Latour 5. These words are not stated randomly, and the reference is meaningful.

What, for Rosenthal, does the ideal of an automaton mean? Let us refer to the etymology: She refused; the paper was, however, published. See for the recent change about the status of anecdotes Lucy Bates and Richard Byrne In the book, written by Carolyn Janice Cherryh, the people living on that planet do feel emotions, but they are never personal.

However, it is hard for the human diplomat to notice it and to prevent himself from construing their behaviour in emotional-relational terms. Moreover, Grandin probably has, like most people diagnosed with autism, excellent reasons for privileging the innate hypothesis for autism. I am not contesting this hypothesis here. This has equally to be understood in the most concrete and practical sense. Most of the time, Grandin is hired to implement a welfare audit; she checks the meatpacking industry for the way people treat animals.

Usually, in such cases, people use electric prods. This led the farm industry to raise new questions and to address animals differently: In other words, Grandin empowers the animals in the sense that she gives them the power to force human beings to transform their habits and to address them differently.

To be honest, I should add that my interpretation raises some problems and is — deliberately — candidly optimistic. But I consider that part of my work as a philosopher is about disclosing promises and possibilities in reconstructing narratives with slight shifts that enable us to inherit, as politely and fruitfully as possible, from these experiences.

Bekoff writes that he is often asked why he concentrates on his companion dog, Jethro, when making general points about social play in canines. Thanks to an anonymous referee who duly reminded me that the notion of partial connections I quote in Haraway comes from her colleague and friend Marilyn Strathern to whom Haraway herself gave credit for the notion. He was suspected of having invented a good part of the story.

For some, he stayed only four weeks and not a few months, as he claimed in the field, for others, the whole story is a fiction; moreover, scientists claim today that wolves never eat mice, etc. I will not try to seek the truth. Duane Quiatt criticizes the two primatologists: Methodological invention is employed to break down the barriers of cultural confinement. It is something that may be done or left undone. It is an intervention. It intervenes in the various available styles for describing practices.

Epistemological normativity is prescriptive: The normativity of ethnographic descriptions is of a different kind.

It suggests what must be taken into account when it comes to appreciating practices. See Haraway , who insists upon the need to stop abandoning ourselves to the temptation of innocence.

We should actually say the contrary: This theory has often been mistaken as strongly materialistic and problematic: In his Essays in Radical Empiricism, James resumes the problem with much more nuanced theories: We may say both, and both will be true. Because the emotional experience is a particular experience in which the world appears as nondivided yet between a subjective knowing subject and an objective world James, , Using anecdotes to investigate animal cognition.

Bekoff M and Allen C Cognitive ethology: Slayers, skeptics, and proponents. State University of New York Press, — Briggs J Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Daston L Intelligences: Columbia University Press, 37— Despret V The body we care for: Estep D and Hetts S Interactions, relationships, and bonds: The conceptual basis for scientist-animal relations.

Cambridge University Press, 6— Haraway D Simians, Cyborgs and Women: Heinrich B Mind of the Raven. James W Principles of Psychology, Vol. James W Essays in Radical Empiricism. Kirk R A Chance Observation: Ethology and the Recovery of Nature of the Laboratory Animals. Conference given at the seminar Animal Subjects under Observation.

Max Planck Institute, Berlin, 10—12 July. Latour B A well articulated primatology: Reflections of a fellow traveler. Models of Science, Gender and Society. University of Chicago Press, — Mol A The Body Multiple. Thirteen Years in the Life of an Elephant Family. University of Chicago Press. Quiatt D Silent partners?

Observations on some systematic relations among observer perspective, theory, and behavior. Rowell T A few peculiar primates.

University of Chicago Press, 57— Smuts B Sex and Friendship in Baboons. Smuts B Embodied communication in non-human animals. Cambridge University Press, — Strum SC Almost Human. Tsing A Frictions: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Viveiros de Castro E Perspectival anthropology and the method of controlled equivocation.

Vinciane Despret is a philosopher and a psychologist. Her doctoral thesis has been published in English: Ethnopsychology and Selfhood Other Press, Her latest book, Que diraient les animaux si. Much attention to date has focused on how the Euro-American individuation of the human subject intensifies the asymmetries inculcated by these divisions.

This paper rehearses some of this literature but goes on to attend to how these divisions undercut understandings of sociality and limit social organization to interaction between persons. Keywords animals, being-in-the-world, Haraway, humankind, partial connection, sociality, Strathern Corresponding author: Reproduced with the kind permission of the artist and the John Martin Gallery, http: Contrastingly, Latimer 79 my extension with animals in their landscape throws me into a world beyond myself; I am experiencing a world vibrant with aesthetic pleasure and connectivity.

Something happens in these early morning walks that changes the scale for me: In terms of the ordering of our worlds, we both have our identities punctualized by a demanding relation Munro, But what is it that happens precisely when we encounter someone we love?

Do we encounter somebody, or is it animals that come to inhabit you, ideas that invade you, movements that move you, sounds that traverse you? And can these things be parted? It is far more complex than that. Haraway and Gane, For example, being alongside can involve cooperating with one another, even working together, but not with the same materials and not necessarily to the same ends.

For Strathern, conceptual and lived relations are co-constitutive. This said, it should be emphasized that relations have no intrinsic value in themselves: So the animal, like the female, is caught as that which is made Other from the human.

Indeed, unlike the female, which is typically seen as supplementary, the animal is often construed as an impediment to being human; animalism and animal-like traits are constituted as the very thing to overcome, harness, enhance or master in order to warrant claims to be fully human. For all this, it is also the case that the human cannot be thought without comparison to the animal.

It is this relation — in all its asymmetry — that brings human exceptionalism into view. It is the connection as much as the division that matters — as Foucault , for example, helps illuminate in his exegesis of how Descartes distinguishes madness and reason.

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

This is held to be consciousness, or mind. Secular ideas of human exceptionalism continue to be rooted in the idea that only humans can think and reason. As has been endlessly discussed, however, there is a fundamental problem with the Cartesian mind. Its very nature, reason, not only separates it from the physical world — the so-called ghost in the machine.

Reason also puts consciousness into a special relation of asymmetry with the physical. This is because all that is body and nature and animal is constituted as knowable by the mind.

As Levinas suggests, this conceptual framing has formed the basis of a highly problematic ethical and political legacy. In all this it is not just the more obvious relations, like eating animals, that is at issue.

As Miele , forthcoming; Higgin et al. An asymmetrical relation in which nature — including the animal out there in the world as well as the animal within — becomes open to intervention, enhancement, exploitation and mastery. Here is Marx [] helping to express what is at the very heart of human exceptionalism: Life itself appears only as a means to life. The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it.

It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity.

It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.

What Marx does not unpick, however, is the tautology that he is caught in: Contrastingly, thinking with the animal — including human animality — helps to raise to view some of the conditions of possibility for our problematic history, particularly with regard to the violence of Othering. Evantix Third-Party Risk Management. Information Technology and Services.

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And yet for sure, we may have the impression that the naked body is a pretext, a pre-text for more philosophy; a kind of blank screen, all the more so since reciprocal gazes do not lead Derrida to share sensualities — or to write about them — nor to discuss the choreography of the morning greeting ceremony. Politeness The issue of nudity does not seem to be a major preoccupation for the scientists — some of them studying swimming animals in the wild confess, in private, that they mostly work naked.

However, the incident Farley Mowat describes is echoed in the practices of some scientists. The primatologist Shirley Strum mentions it in passing when she describes her daily routine with the baboons she observes. However, the question she raises has practical, vital, and I would add ethical consequences, for her and for the baboons she works with. But the risk of missing something was worrying her more and more; she decided after a while that she could try to urinate while staying among the baboons.

She cautiously undressed, looking around. They were, she says, astonished by the noise. Nothing made them believe that she could be a baboon. Next time, she concluded, they would not even react. The story Strum tells us is linked to the second question I noted though only rarely in ethological and primatological literature, the polite question: Looking and looking back on this occasion occurs not only in the gaze of those who meet and learn to know each other: Maybe this time we might say that the empathy was on the side of the baboons.

Farley Mowat describes a situation that is apparently very similar. In other words, Mowat used his body to make the animals respond. He decided to pitch his tent near to it in order to observe them, day and night. The wolves completely ignored him.

Actually, wolves were regularly passing by the tent and never evinced the slightest interest in him. Being ignored to such an extent became more and more intolerable for Mowat as time passed. Therefore, Mowat planned to use this knowledge to make them at least recognize his existence. This took most of the night and required, as he meticulously explains, frequent returns to the tent to consume quantities Despret 67 of tea.

As usual, the animal ignored the tent and its human owner, until he passed by a marked bush: After a minute of complete indecision he backed away a few yards and sat down. At this moment, Mowat became very worried: The wolf kept looking at him. Then the wolf slowly began a systematic tour of the area and carefully placed his own mark on each of the ones the human had marked. In fact, it is not only the conventions of writing that render this unlikely; it is the very codes of practice.

Smuts recalls that progress in habituation was painfully slow: Ignoring social cues, she learned, is far from neutral social behaviour. Smuts therefore had to learn to be polite, in the ethical, political, and epistemological senses of the word. She learned to respond, to acknowledge, to look back, perhaps to greet, as she says. And, as she tells us, her own being was transformed: I was learning a whole new way of being in the world — the way of baboons.

She explains that, having learned the way baboons express their emotions, motivations or intentions, she could respond to them in ways she picked up from them and be understood.

Once out of the Land Rover, she observed the way Ray, an immigrant male, made his own approach to enter the troop. And she imitated him. One day Ray, positioning himself between Strum and two resident males, solicited her support in agonistic interaction with them.

Strum refused to cooperate, and she did it in the way the baboons taught her: It is to insist upon the fact that if we are to understand how scientists may talk about their animals and how they make them known, and if we are to elucidate how these animals gain new identities through the very practices, we would be better served if we told stories about these embodied encounters.

As Annemarie Mol calls it: Bodies enact rather than perform as Mol also suggests , and considering them as enacting blurs the clear-cut divide between knowing subject and known object: This is not only an epistemological issue, it is a political one and an ontological one. In attending to a praxiographic account of their work, and moreover through paying attention to the way they embody their work, I hope, for my part, that my own account has made these scientists more real, without diminishing or obscuring the reality of the animals that actively participate in the research process.

Empathy is a word that is very often recruited in these kinds of stories, especially when bodies are involved. It bears resonances with troublesome romantic meanings, magic or folk knowledge. Nevertheless, I choose to keep it, but only as a tool, in order to give it other meanings, to complicate the situations where this word may be evoked.

Empathy becomes multiple, as are bodies, as are encounters, as are animals who are the living actors of these encounters. Bodies are articulating, and become articulated, in the asking and in its responses. To urinate in front of an animal may create what Anna Tsing calls frictions. It matters for them that it matters for their animals. Empathy, in this case, is not feeling what the other feels, it is rather making the body available for the response of another being.

It is to make ourselves and them corresponding, in all the senses my Oxford dictionary gives: The empathy is not the same. For their purpose is not alike either. She is neither trying to get knowledge — knowing for the sake of knowing — nor trying to get involved in the life of the animals she tries to identify with.

An emotion, according to James, is not what is felt, but what makes us feel. In other words, our feelings dispose our bodies, our bodies dispose our feelings.

The actors, James says, all know this simple fact: He quotes psychologist Fechner: When the baboons gave dirty looks to the former, she had to learn to act with them, to leave room for them to resist her proposition or her presence.

Acting with them is not the result but the very condition of acting like them. Empathy makes us think with, and with the body. A last thought, to conclude: It is never given, even if it is a gift. But authenticity is not lost: Acknowledgements I am grateful to my colleague John Pearson for revising the last version of the manuscript and for his suggestions.

I also wish to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments, sound critiques, and warm encouragements. However true this may be, these kind of complaints are a loi du genre, whose aim is to claim that you can only suffer these hardships if you really love animals.

I could recall here the famous Clever Hans, the German horse that performed extraordinary feats among others, Hans could solve arithmetical problems to which he gave the answer by knocking with his feet. See Bernd Heinrich for the ravens, Zahavi and Zahavi for the babblers, Cynthia Moss for the elephants, and Thelma Rowell for the sheep — many others could be mentioned.

Bruno Latour inspires much of my work dealing with scientists working with animals. For an example in the field of ethology and primatology see Latour 5. These words are not stated randomly, and the reference is meaningful. What, for Rosenthal, does the ideal of an automaton mean? Let us refer to the etymology: She refused; the paper was, however, published. See for the recent change about the status of anecdotes Lucy Bates and Richard Byrne In the book, written by Carolyn Janice Cherryh, the people living on that planet do feel emotions, but they are never personal.

However, it is hard for the human diplomat to notice it and to prevent himself from construing their behaviour in emotional-relational terms. Moreover, Grandin probably has, like most people diagnosed with autism, excellent reasons for privileging the innate hypothesis for autism. I am not contesting this hypothesis here.

This has equally to be understood in the most concrete and practical sense. Most of the time, Grandin is hired to implement a welfare audit; she checks the meatpacking industry for the way people treat animals.

Usually, in such cases, people use electric prods. This led the farm industry to raise new questions and to address animals differently: In other words, Grandin empowers the animals in the sense that she gives them the power to force human beings to transform their habits and to address them differently.

To be honest, I should add that my interpretation raises some problems and is — deliberately — candidly optimistic. But I consider that part of my work as a philosopher is about disclosing promises and possibilities in reconstructing narratives with slight shifts that enable us to inherit, as politely and fruitfully as possible, from these experiences.

Bekoff writes that he is often asked why he concentrates on his companion dog, Jethro, when making general points about social play in canines. Thanks to an anonymous referee who duly reminded me that the notion of partial connections I quote in Haraway comes from her colleague and friend Marilyn Strathern to whom Haraway herself gave credit for the notion.

He was suspected of having invented a good part of the story. For some, he stayed only four weeks and not a few months, as he claimed in the field, for others, the whole story is a fiction; moreover, scientists claim today that wolves never eat mice, etc. I will not try to seek the truth. Duane Quiatt criticizes the two primatologists: Methodological invention is employed to break down the barriers of cultural confinement.

It is something that may be done or left undone. It is an intervention. It intervenes in the various available styles for describing practices. Epistemological normativity is prescriptive: The normativity of ethnographic descriptions is of a different kind.

It suggests what must be taken into account when it comes to appreciating practices. See Haraway , who insists upon the need to stop abandoning ourselves to the temptation of innocence.

We should actually say the contrary: This theory has often been mistaken as strongly materialistic and problematic: In his Essays in Radical Empiricism, James resumes the problem with much more nuanced theories: We may say both, and both will be true.

Because the emotional experience is a particular experience in which the world appears as nondivided yet between a subjective knowing subject and an objective world James, , Using anecdotes to investigate animal cognition. Bekoff M and Allen C Cognitive ethology: Slayers, skeptics, and proponents. State University of New York Press, — Briggs J Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Daston L Intelligences: Columbia University Press, 37— Despret V The body we care for: Estep D and Hetts S Interactions, relationships, and bonds: The conceptual basis for scientist-animal relations.

Cambridge University Press, 6— Haraway D Simians, Cyborgs and Women: Heinrich B Mind of the Raven. James W Principles of Psychology, Vol. James W Essays in Radical Empiricism. Kirk R A Chance Observation: Ethology and the Recovery of Nature of the Laboratory Animals. Conference given at the seminar Animal Subjects under Observation. Max Planck Institute, Berlin, 10—12 July. Latour B A well articulated primatology: Reflections of a fellow traveler.

Models of Science, Gender and Society. University of Chicago Press, — Mol A The Body Multiple. Thirteen Years in the Life of an Elephant Family. University of Chicago Press. Quiatt D Silent partners? Observations on some systematic relations among observer perspective, theory, and behavior. Rowell T A few peculiar primates. University of Chicago Press, 57— Smuts B Sex and Friendship in Baboons.

Smuts B Embodied communication in non-human animals. Cambridge University Press, — Strum SC Almost Human. Tsing A Frictions: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Viveiros de Castro E Perspectival anthropology and the method of controlled equivocation. Vinciane Despret is a philosopher and a psychologist. Her doctoral thesis has been published in English: Ethnopsychology and Selfhood Other Press, Her latest book, Que diraient les animaux si.

Much attention to date has focused on how the Euro-American individuation of the human subject intensifies the asymmetries inculcated by these divisions. This paper rehearses some of this literature but goes on to attend to how these divisions undercut understandings of sociality and limit social organization to interaction between persons. Keywords animals, being-in-the-world, Haraway, humankind, partial connection, sociality, Strathern Corresponding author: Reproduced with the kind permission of the artist and the John Martin Gallery, http: Contrastingly, Latimer 79 my extension with animals in their landscape throws me into a world beyond myself; I am experiencing a world vibrant with aesthetic pleasure and connectivity.

Something happens in these early morning walks that changes the scale for me: In terms of the ordering of our worlds, we both have our identities punctualized by a demanding relation Munro, But what is it that happens precisely when we encounter someone we love? Do we encounter somebody, or is it animals that come to inhabit you, ideas that invade you, movements that move you, sounds that traverse you?

And can these things be parted? It is far more complex than that. Haraway and Gane, For example, being alongside can involve cooperating with one another, even working together, but not with the same materials and not necessarily to the same ends. For Strathern, conceptual and lived relations are co-constitutive. This said, it should be emphasized that relations have no intrinsic value in themselves: So the animal, like the female, is caught as that which is made Other from the human.

Indeed, unlike the female, which is typically seen as supplementary, the animal is often construed as an impediment to being human; animalism and animal-like traits are constituted as the very thing to overcome, harness, enhance or master in order to warrant claims to be fully human. For all this, it is also the case that the human cannot be thought without comparison to the animal.

It is this relation — in all its asymmetry — that brings human exceptionalism into view. It is the connection as much as the division that matters — as Foucault , for example, helps illuminate in his exegesis of how Descartes distinguishes madness and reason. The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

This is held to be consciousness, or mind. Secular ideas of human exceptionalism continue to be rooted in the idea that only humans can think and reason. As has been endlessly discussed, however, there is a fundamental problem with the Cartesian mind. Its very nature, reason, not only separates it from the physical world — the so-called ghost in the machine.

Reason also puts consciousness into a special relation of asymmetry with the physical. This is because all that is body and nature and animal is constituted as knowable by the mind. As Levinas suggests, this conceptual framing has formed the basis of a highly problematic ethical and political legacy. In all this it is not just the more obvious relations, like eating animals, that is at issue.

As Miele , forthcoming; Higgin et al. An asymmetrical relation in which nature — including the animal out there in the world as well as the animal within — becomes open to intervention, enhancement, exploitation and mastery.

Here is Marx [] helping to express what is at the very heart of human exceptionalism: Life itself appears only as a means to life. The animal is immediately one with its life activity.

It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges.

Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i. What Marx does not unpick, however, is the tautology that he is caught in: Contrastingly, thinking with the animal — including human animality — helps to raise to view some of the conditions of possibility for our problematic history, particularly with regard to the violence of Othering.

Amongst others, Elizabeth Grosz has helped show how femininity has been strongly associated historically with the physical, the body, nature, and animality. Imprisoned in a Nazi camp, Levinas asks: Are we not men? It is left to a dog, Bobby, to answer: What I want also to stress is that this labouring of the relation between the human and the animal is partly how civilizations are done. This ontology, I suggest, is based not on division but on an ordering of relations that is caught in the mode of comparison between the human and the animal.

Animals Within What I now go on to consider are ways out of the Euro-American mode of comparison through which relations between the human and the animal are ordered — ways that allow for a revaluing of the animal without the elevation of a human sovereign subjectivity. A number of theorists have reworked the relation between the human and the animal by re-membering human carnality, and the animality of the human.

In emphasizing the hidden of the animal within, Deleuze is associating animal with carnality but also with something that hunts and haunts, with a kind of violence. The animal within is thus about some kind of rawness through which to escape the habitus: Because of this he, in a sense like Marx, maintains a division: What is the posthuman? Think of it as a point of view characterised by the following assumptions. First, the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life.

Second, the posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor side show.

Third, the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born.

As Midgley suggests, there were many ways in which the human sciences, in the name of protecting human dignity, conspired with particular colonial values.

But to what extent do continuities and biological relatedness erode the asymmetrical relations of ordering in the mode of comparison between human and other animals discussed above? He is a trained zoologist, geneticist and evolutionary biologist, and has written about telomeres, the tails of chromosomes. He spends much of his free time doing what he calls citizen science: In particular, he tells me that sea squirts are close to us in evolutionary terms they share the same DNA , yet they do not share any of the same characteristics as humans in terms of behaviour Kipling, Kipling, email correspondence, Latimer 89 Figure 2.

A species of sea squirt. Reproduced with the kind permission of David Kipling. Thus biological relatedness between human and other kinds may point to overlap, but not in ways that presume identity. In her analysis of British kinship in Reproducing the Future, Marilyn Strathern c shows us how people, let alone non-humans, can be biologically near related but socially far and vice versa. Substance in common does not presuppose closeness or connection.

While octopi may not reason, they are closer to the human because they are sentient and intelligent can think: Because of this, we empathize with it: To recapitulate the earlier argument, humanism works divisions — between the body nature, the material and consciousness the metaphysical , between self and other, between inside and outside, and between human and animal. The new biology shows that while some species are more biologically related to humans than previously thought, biological relatedness does not presume social closeness.

Eroding the Singularity of Divides The reasons for animals being folded into humanist ethics are complex. As has been discussed above, it is not so much to do with connectedness but with similitude: Inclusion in the fold of human sociality is thus imagined in ways through which animals have to become more and more human-like. In all this the human—non-human animal issue is not just about biology. Attention to being-with as distinct from being-there brings back into play how human existence is always about being in relation.

As Latimer 91 Pyyhtinen helps remind us in his discussion of Simmel: Rather than going with Deleuze on becoming animal, and the multiplicity that follows from becoming animal, discussed above, she focuses on what happens when humans become-with another kind.

Rather, what she is trying to get us to see is how sociality is a matter of becoming with other kinds, and that this kind of sociality needs to be admitted and cherished as ethical as well as being good politics. Within this view, companion species are not dogs or rabbits — the usual way of categorizing domesticated animals. The partners do not precede their relating; all that is, is the fruit of becoming with: Companion species then, for Haraway, come into being through a way of interspecies relationality.

In an echo of Bruno Latour , she is suggesting that we have never been human. Here, I want to suggest that her idea of companion species enacts something endemic to contemporary versions of being human. Implicitly Haraway is not just arguing that the companion species is in a state of being-with, or even a process of becoming-with. Rather, at least in its better moments, this being-with produces and reproduces something that is greater than either.

Haraway is explicit about this in talking about her dog. Haraway with her dog — in agility training and competition — come into view as transcending the limits of singularities; indeed, they are enhanced. What gets performed, at least for a moment, is about becoming better than one. There are two issues to be concerned about here.

In joining in, is the dog Cayenne to some extent becoming more human than dog? Is the infolding we witness here a human concern, a translation of the dog into human interests competition, agility , particularly those of enhancement: For all my sympathy with Haraway, it is hard not to resist seeing that her hybrid remains a world that is made up of a sociality of two.

For me, it is a dyadic hybrid, whose parts become something other than they are Latimer 93 without becoming with the other. And, moreover, it is about being infolded, as an inward not an outward movement.

Let me turn to the sculptures by the artist Olivia Musgrave to help exemplify my argument here. Olivia described herself as both Anglo-Irish and Greek, and as inheriting myths and traditions from both, including growing up in Ireland with and around horses. I liked her ideas of inheritance, partly because it gets us out of the prism of the individual and helps illuminate the idea that we are only ever made up of the parts of others, discussed by me in an earlier paper about Frida Kahlo Latimer, Olivia has read this paper and is happy with my interpretation.

To begin with, the women and the horses are unadorned: And this partial connectivity is made all the more sensual and intense by the nakedness of the horses and the nakedness of the women. There is also a partial connection between the women. The women face each other and are clearly doing something that is very familiarly human — they are discoursing and gesturing to each other.

These are horse-ways of being-with each other. And of course what we can see is that the horses and the women are alongside each other. The women are no longer discoursing humans but disciplined riders, wrists arched and hands raised, working invisible reins. So here is a particular state of being-with, of Mitsein, a form of sociality that is not a collapsing into a hybrid; nor do the horses or the humans become each other. However, this kind of relation also depends on both attachments and detachments between humans and humans, humans and horses, and horses and horses that are impermanent and irreducible.

The horse is now not striding out, nor even nuzzling its companion, but is a comfortable and strong back support! Their pose is relaxed, composed and peaceful. And there is tension. It takes a moment to catch it, but it is there: Rather, the horse is, unlike the woman, partially poised for either rest or movement: This detail is an expression of tension between the Amazonian woman and the horse that gives us a moment not of hybridity but of partial connection, and of the tension in partial division.

This is a depiction of relations between horses and human that constitutes being alongside, in which each part remains partially connected but also partially divided. I want therefore to suggest that these sculptures perform a kind of dwelling in which the horses remain distinctively horse, and are only partially humanized, while the women are only partially inhabited by the horse — the women each have other concerns each other, home, a book, where they have just been or are about to go.

And further, each is also able at any moment to move on, to push away from each other, to disconnect and separate, and attach to other extensions.

Critically, both horses and women are also faceless. Rather, it is one of the ways that the sculptures help us to get away from the individualizing of persons, to celebrate a world of relations rather than subjects, however interactive.

In place of the notion of hybridity, in line with what I suggested earlier, these sculptures not only represent connections; they preserve a sense of division. However, in so doing, to get us out of the mode of comparison, its involutions return its relations — which are always multiple and complex — inevitably to wholes, however complex and plural, a move all too familiar in the Western tradition Strathern, b. In contrast, what I am elucidating is the extent to which relations involve aspects that are division-preserving as much as they may also dissolve or dispose of boundaries.

Conclusions Reconsiderations of human—animal relations entail the enactment of an ontology of connectivity that is itself connected to and is helping to re-imagine relations between persons and nature — what Ross proposes as a new ethics of inclusion. In contrast to Latour I am building on the idea that contemporary reconsiderations of the asymmetrical relation between the human and the animal are precisely enacting a new kind of ethical politics — one that brings all that is animal into the fold of humanism to help constitute a more ethically aware, conscious and conscientious social reality.

Subsequently I pointed to how some of these newer conceptions can still perform some of the old asymmetries. As such she helps us to see how companion species are not dogs or cats but composite beings, a species that comes into being through a way of becoming-with other kinds.

To avoid instituting a new exceptionalism with the idea of a companion species, I have argued that we sometimes need to augment the notion of being-with with that of our being alongside. Like Whatmore this issue , I am stressing the intermittency and partialness of connection and disconnection at the same time as I preserve a sense of more-than-human world-making.

My aim has been to stress the possibility of dwelling with non-humans as preserving division and alterity as much as connectivity and unity Latimer 99 however plural. This is of particular importance for those others who are at risk of exclusion because they are not included in the valorization of human—non-human hybrids and are invisible and neglected Puig de la Bellacasa, Rethinking animal and human relations is then as much to do — as Bell, cited earlier, argues — with attending to nature and with reconstituting humans as being as much a part of nature as any other creatures, however domesticated, tamed, exploited, acculturated and socialized.

Here, openness does not return us to the parts, the individual subjects and their subjectivities see, for example, Battaglia, , but to relations. What is being played out is something to do with recovering our groundedness in nature, and recognizing that any form of social life that simply debases the animal, and all those humans who have been and will continue to be animalized, is likely to be impoverished if not deeply — at root — ethically problematic.

Let me apologize in advance for this anthropomorphic and modernist trope. I am fully aware that horses may not have purposes, but I am human after all and only have my stories and my words! While I can try to think horse, there is no way out of the use of words to do it with. Agamben G and Attell K. Battaglia D Toward an ethics of the open subject: Writing culture in good conscience.

Bauman Z Effacing the face: Carey J The politics of friends: Animals and deconstructive opportunity. Dwelling with animals after Levinas. Critchley S Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Deleuze G [] Dialogues, trans. Puig de la Bellacasa M. Deleuze G Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. E Weber and P Kamuf eds Points. Stanford University Press, — Derrida J The animal that therefore I am more to follow , trans.

Critical Inquiry 28 2: Derrida J And say the animal responded? Wolfe C and Wills D. The Question of the Animal. Stanford University Press, 62— Douglas M Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. Foucault M My body, this paper, this fire.

Oxford Literary Review 4 1: Geertz G Interpretation of Cultures. Grosz E Refiguring bodies. Latimer Haraway D A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. Dogs, People and Significant Otherness. Haraway D and Gane N When we have never been human, what is to be done? Interview with Donna Haraway. Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics.

Heidegger M Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie J and Robinson E. Heidegger M a The question concerning technology. Heidegger M b Building, dwelling, thinking. Socio-technical organisations of farm animal slaughter. Ingold T Building, dwelling, living: How animals and people make themselves at home in the world.

Transformations in Anthropological Knowledge. Jordan T Troubling companions: Companion species and the politics of inter-relations. Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 19 4: Kipling D Genetics, evolutionary biology and human-animal relations. Latimer J Unsettling bodies: Latimer J Conclusions: Defacing horror, realigning nurses. Boundaries, Bodies and Health Work. Latimer J b Rewriting bodies, portraiting persons?

The gene, the clinic and the figure of the human. Latimer J and Munro R Driving the social. The Sociological Review, 54 s1: Relational extension, the idea of home, and otherness. Space and Culture 12 3: The Sociological Review, 59 3: Levinas E The name of a dog, or natural rights. Essays on Judaism, trans. The Athlone Press, —3.

Originally published in Celui qui ne peut pas se servir des mots, Montpellier: Manning A and Serpell J Introduction. Marx K [] Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: Melley T A terminal case: William Burroughs and the logic of addiction. Cultural Studies in Addiction. University of California Press. Midgley M Bridge-building at last. Miele M forthcoming Making animals kill-able: The techno-ethic of the slaughterhouse.

Munro R a Alignments and identity-work: The study of accounts and accountability. R Munro and J Mouritsen eds Accountability: Power, Ethos and the Technologies of Managing. Thomson International Business Press. Munro R b The consumption view of self: Munro R Punctualizing identity: Time and the demanding relation.

Musgrave O a The fates talk — 1. Musgrave O b The fates talk — 2. Oxford Dictionaries Available at: Probyn E Outside Belongings.

Latimer Pyyhtinen O Being-with: Ross SD Plenishment in the Earth: An Ethic of Inclusion. State University of New York Press. Singer P Animal Liberation: Spivak GC Can the subaltern speak?

University of Illinois Press, — Strathern M a After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century. Strathern M b Parts and wholes: Refiguring relationships in a postplural world. Strathern M c Reproducing the Future: Anthropology, Kinship, and the New Reproductive Technologies.

Strathern M The Relation. Strathern M Gender: Social Spaces and the Labour of Division. Strathern M Property, Substance and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons and Things. Strathern M Abstraction and decontextualisation: An anthropological comment or: Strathern M Commons and Borderlands: Symons GL Choreographing identities and emotions in organizations: Society and Animals 17 2: Vandenberghe F Reconstructing humans: A humanist critique of actantnetwork theory. Wolfe C Zoontologies: She has published widely on medicine, science, the body and culture, and contributed to publications at the cutting edge of social theory, including on the art of dwelling Space and Culture and the politics of imagination The Sociological Review.

Her current studies explore the divisions between nature and culture, human and non-human, death and life, the normal and the pathological, including an ongoing ethnography of ageing and biology. Such arguments are examined in the light of ethnography and interviews with field biologists who work with meerkats under conditions of habituation. Building on this contrast, I will argue that the logic of scientific habituation remains difficult to grasp as long as we think of it exclusively in terms of human-animal relations.

In conclusion I suggest that this account of habituation sheds a new light on the articulations and disjunctions between diverse practices and commitments in social anthropology, philosophy and biological science. However, a number of popular writings by primatologists e. And more generally, how might anthropologists or sociologists of science make sense of the seemingly contradictory demands and expectations placed on habituation by practising and aspiring scientists?

It is the practice of philosophers and sociologists of science who have in the past few decades been seeking to move beyond the unproductive debates of the science wars, to articulate a new kind of relationship between science and science studies. Both are concerned with the balance between describing and transforming. Understandings of what is at stake in habituation are a key point where the scientists I work with and the philosophers I read are most visibly diverging — a key point therefore for examining the intersection of these two practices.

Other authors have sought for alternatives within the practices of animal scientists themselves. Obligations apply inwards, to those who reclaim themselves of a practice. Requirements apply outwards, to the milieu in which this practice exists. Despret in particular has articulated what this would mean in the case of animals: Despret, however, wants to draw the very opposite lesson: For instance, primatologist Barbara Smuts, describing her initial attempts to ignore the baboons she works with and thus get them to ignore her, noted: Right from the start, they knew better, insisting that I was, like them, a social subject vulnerable to the demands and rewards of relationship.

Since I was in their world, they determined the rules of the game, and I was thus compelled to Candea explore the unknown terrain of human-baboon intersubjectivity.

More generally, and beyond primatology, Gregory Radick has argued that the central commitment of mid-century ethology the disciplinary precursor of contemporary behavioural ecology was precisely its attention to what mattered to animals: Cheney and Seyfarth, Over the years, the project grew and began to enrol volunteers mostly UK biology graduates , each of whom would spend a year at the remote farmhouse in South Africa from where the project was run.

The number of meerkat groups followed by the project grew in proportion. You want, basically, to be a tree. But a tree that gives food for rewards. T]hey are also living animals, they have feelings. So if you work with them like a machine or robot [. Yeah, you need to. Yeah, and which one would prefer egg, which one would prefer water. Indeed, the same volunteers would just as often describe their pride and happiness when meerkats ignored them.

Thus Annie, an experienced volunteer, recalled: So one time I was at Godzilla5 and they were war-dancing6 Toyota. And they war-danced at me. So that was good. Outsiders to the site, including prospective volunteers, also felt some of these contradictions between interaction and non-interaction. Yeah, I actually asked [.

In trying to make sense of these seeming contradictions in the way volunteers understood habituation and their relations or not with meerkats, let us therefore look in more detail at the actual processes of habituation at the site.

Habituating Meerkats, Training Volunteers. When it came to habituation, he explained: I need to get these groups habituated as quickly as possible. And the meerkats would occasionally push back. In describing the qualities required of a good habituator, Al stressed patience and endurance: You need to react as the meerkats react. Upon their initial arrival at the project, junior volunteers were trained in data collection with fully habituated groups by shadowing a more experienced volunteer for two weeks.

As Phil, another experienced volunteer, put it: I guess the training process is by going to slightly harder groups as you become more experienced. Similarly, Al noted regretfully that he could not directly check the technique of volunteer habituators.

I feel like with farms. Like for cattle, are they for milk, are they for meat. The self-evident boundary between habituation and domestication was an extremely profound undercurrent in the way volunteers spoke about the meerkats, particularly when discussion turned to ethical matters.

This ultimate independence was the usual stopping point which was invoked to show that, despite habituation, the animals were still, ultimately, wild.

But I would argue it points to a rather profound conceptual dissonance. Clearly, habituation is entirely driven by the interest of the scientists in the meerkats. However, as outlined in the above interview excerpt, it mattered what kind of interest. Furthermore, whereas farming or pet-keeping operate by attaching the vital, emotional, economic interests of humans to the interests of nonhumans, habituation, by contrast, should precisely not arouse the interest of the meerkats.

Behaviourally, the meerkats must remain visibly uninterested in what the scientists are doing for their behaviour to count as natural. In sum, habituation can only serve the interests of the scientists if it ensures the meerkats are left to fend for themselves and pursue their own interests unimpeded. One option, as ever, is translation. This in turn — the concern with ensuring that this knot has been tied in the right way, that habituation has not slipped into domestication, for instance — is what binds together Kalahari Meerkat Project researchers as a community of practice.

As I wrote above, to attempt to recreate the classic form of the experimental achievement in these conditions is, for these philosophers, wrong in a simultaneously ethical and epistemic sense. For the Kalahari Meerkat Project researchers, on the other hand, the experimental achievement is possible, simply because — somewhat paradoxically — meerkats are not the object. What Is the Object? Meerkat Epistemic Things While my initial sketch in the previous section began to show the way habituation articulated interest and disinterest, it still glosses over one major complication.

Habituation thus had two mutually opposed aims: Firstly, behavioural data was never normally collected during weighing sessions see Candea, Secondly, the volunteers had developed two separate calls to mark the distinction between feeding and non-feeding periods: In practice, however, the meerkats were rather smarter than the behaviourist conditioning model predicted.

In sum, the properly habituated meerkat should ideally be a double creature: Reciprocally, while habituation aimed to produce double meerkats, training produced double volunteers. Then, when a second later she resumed her foraging, he added that the behaviour was natural again, and duly resumed data collection. In the process of studying these particular behaviours, modifying other behaviours was unavoidable. Meerkats were not one thing, or even, as I suggested above, two.

The concern with keeping epistemic things separate from experimental conditions is in itself not particularly surprising or new. But this distinction gives a new handle on the logic of habituation. Crucially, however, those framed aspects of nature are not meerkats as a whole but rather a subset of their behaviour. However, the researchers are unambiguously clear that the fact they are working on meerkats is, ultimately, incidental to other broader interests.

Meerkats are not the object. Meerkats as a whole might engage individual Kalahari Meerkat Project volunteers as subjects in interaction.

The realization that the meerkats are not the object of study rearticulates what might otherwise seem to be contradictions at the heart of habituation. It shows how it is possible to both distance and interest meerkats, to both modify their behaviour and observe it in a state of nature, to enjoy and seek both their friendliness and their Candea disinterest, to care for them both as subjects and objects, both as characters and as bearers of data.

Indeed Stengers explicitly eschews both holism and reductivism for a thought-provoking third option, a sort of performative commitment to relational recognition: The ability to have a perspective is itself a relational achievement.

Whitehead, William James, and Isabelle Stengers. There is a neat recursion here: Their connection is an event that matters in diverging ways for the wasp and for the orchid.

Philosophers would leave deconstructive critique aside and learn to celebrate what Stengers argues really matters to scientists — namely, their ability to produce experimental realities. Both practices are concerned with establishing relations between entities with diverging aims and modes of existence. Both practices are concerned with the interplay of description and transformation. Both bear simultaneously on epistemic, ethical and ontological matters. The clear delineation of these positions is partly heuristic, rehearsing the classic anthropological bifurcation between ethnography and theory cf.

The anthropological challenge which I have tried to take up here is to consider both and relate them, without reducing the one to the other. The striving for a type of double vision — seeing ethnography with one eye, as it were, and theory with the other cf.

All the research participants are quoted here under pseudonyms. Godzilla is one of the 19 groups followed by the project. It is worth noting that all of the volunteers at the time of my second fieldwork were themselves former or current owners of pets — and thus that they spoke from experience about the different nature of their relationship to meerkats.

References Alcayna-Stevens L In the shadow of man: An exploration of pan-human perspectives in a Catalonian chimpanzee sanctuary. Cambridge Anthropology 28 1: Alcayna-Stevens L Inalienable worlds: Cambridge Anthropology 30 2: Domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc bay. Engagement and detachment in human-animal relations. American Ethnologist 37 2: Candea M Suspending belief: American Anthropologist 3: Inside the Mind of Another Species.

Includes Everything in Basic. Includes Everything in Basic and Pro. Richmond Behavioral Health Authority. The McHenry Management Group. Mechanical or Industrial Engineering. Evantix Third-Party Risk Management. Information Technology and Services. Heyman Associates Heyman Associates.

Flowers Hospital Home Flowers Hospital. Consumer Product Testing Company, Inc. Consumer Product Testing Company. Centerline Solutions Centerline Solutions. Chickasaw Nation Industries, Inc.

maximum extension feet

The ensuing discussion gelled into a decision to give our research collaboration a public face — the Ryedale Flood Research Group RFRG that, from this point on, began to overtake the methodological principles that had guided its initiation.

So if you have got half the size of gutter, it comes over the top more quickly. Going public took the form of an exhibition in Pickering Civic Centre. The event was advertised in the local press and held on a Tuesday in October , a few months after the group had ceased to meet regularly. In such moments the ontological settlement that divides the social from the natural, and which expert environmental management practices assume and perpetuate, loses its grip.

The series of small bunds made out of vernacular materials that the RFRG proposed are even now being constructed in the upper catchment of Pickering Beck and Ryedale. I have tried to give some sense of the diversity of scholarship exploring this ontopolitical tack — in STS, political theory, anthropology and geography, among others. Rather, it is also one that we might wish still to call ideological. The question we have to ask ourselves [he argues] is not whether we have accurately represented some pre-existing phenomena or entity but whether there is now a distance between the new repertoire of actions and the repertoire with which we started.

In this, it differs from the usage we later came across in medical and legal circles in which competency groups refer to gatherings of professional practitioners of specialist branches of medicine or law. Man and Animal, trans. The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze. Posthumanism and the Other Within. Governing a Technological Society. A Political Ecology of Things. Whatmore 49 Braun, B. Technoscience, Democracy and Public Life. University of Minnesota Press, ix—xl.

Economic externalities revisited by sociology. The Laws of Markets. Essay on Technological Democracy, trans. First published , Agir dans un monde incertain. Essai sur la democratie technique. Sociable Life on a Dynamic Planet. Ohio State University Press. Experiments in Postvital Living. Biopolitics and Philosophy, trans. Interfaces with New Media.

Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. Free Association Books, — Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Bodies and Machines at Speed. Law J and Hassard, J. New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture.

University of Minnesota Press, — MacArthur E and Paulson W. University of Michigan Press. University of Minnesota Press, 3— Economy and Society 40 4: Her research addresses the interface between cultural geography, political theory and science and technology studies.

Bodies are multiple, as are the practices that involve them: Still others are faced with the question: Keywords animals, bodies, embodied communication, empathy, field practices, partial affinities However important feelings and interpretations may be, they are not alone in making up what life is all about.

Sometimes — mostly Corresponding author: An unwritten rule obviously reigns in animal sciences: Compared to this general trend, Konrad Lorenz, the famous Austrian ethologist, appears to be an exception.

Lorenz swam with the geese, acted like a mother with little goose Martina, called and greeted like them — later on he was even courted by some of them: It became a human-body-with-a-goose or a with-a-jackdaw Despret, These experiences are, however, as I noted above, very rare.

The fact that the body is rarely mentioned per se because science is the cognitive activity par excellence is, however, not the sole reason for its absence. Field workers for the most part strive to remain detached, passive in external appearance, unresponsive to overtures.

This reduces communication between the two to a minimum. Others spend enormous amounts of time and energy habituating the animal to the presence of the investigator. Investigators do not often describe how their subjects react to them. One is the observer, the other the observed. How may we hope to seek in the abundant ethological literature the rare moments where the body has mattered so much that mentioning it was worthwhile, if not unavoidable?

A brief return to Lorenz might give us some cues. These new approaches bear a resemblance to the theoretical ground upon which Lorenz designed his practice.

This insight is well founded, as we shall see, but it is only partially sound. On the other hand, scientists may engage their body for other motives than perceiving what the animals observe, sense, feel or live: One may indeed construct a perspective without involving the body. According to the Umwelt theory, animals only perceive things that have a meaning for them; things that have no meaning are not perceived.

Moreover, the animal construes meanings in acting — a thing taking the meaning of the action that it renders possible — and this very thing therefore exists for this animal.

The paradigmatic example associated with his name is the tick, whose world is composed of only a few phenomena: The searcher is no longer pursuing a semiological query: As Lorraine Daston writes: The language of perspective carries with it weighty assumptions about what it means to understand other minds.

Here, I can only hint at the several intellectual and cultural shifts that created the perspectival mode: The critics have objected to this in two ways. I, for my part, wish to take the other side of the question, though not merely the reverse side: In a word, my question will become: Allow to marinate for about two hours. Cut belly pork into small cubes and fry slowly until most of the fat has been rendered.

Now add a cup of alcohol and six or eight cloves. The cream sauce can be made according to any standard recipe. The body belonged to a biologist, Farley Mowat, who, at the end of the s, was sent to conduct research on wild wolves in the Arctic. The experiment was about the wolves.

Could a diet comprised only of mice be possible anyway? The solution was to follow what the wolves do: Wolves eat the whole mouse. Even if it was the case that this is what Mowat aimed to do, we should notice that he goes further: Grandin became a notorious expert in designing factory plants for humane slaughter systems and she is frequently hired to check meatpacking plants where there are problems. She argues that in most cases problems are due to unnoticed tiny details that frighten the animals, which in turn resist or balk.

Grandin sees these details we do not see, because she sees like animals. She says she thinks the way animals think. She sees like animals, therefore she may tell people why their animals are doing the things they do. For the animals, as well as for Grandin, the world is a swirling mass of tiny details. This is, however, not what I intend. Still, this is not enough. You have to see in details, like animals do. Because, according to Grandin, animals are visual thinkers.

And so is she. Temple Grandin is autistic: All that means that her empathy actually is a strange empathy, an apparent oxymoron: However, I would suggest that this link is a short-cut to something more complicated. Yes, she transforms her handicap into a gift, which empowers her, as much as she actively transforms mindless animals into meaningful geniuses, which also gives them new powers; but this is not the whole story.

She ends up not being the same. Identity is the outcome, the achievement. It has nothing to do with a romantic unmediated gift; it has to do with Despret 61 years of hard work — and love. Empathy may be innate — or not — but it ought nevertheless to be cultivated, nurtured, educated.

Here is the promise of objectivity: This would give us a less problematic version of embodied empathy: Experimental Bodies Back now to Mowat and his wolves, about whom I was drawing the contrast: Why was it so important to experiment with what wolves eat?

In the late s, wolves were hardly known by scientists and actually did not arouse much interest. However, they were the subjects of hot political controversies. More and more hunters were coming back from more and more hunts with fewer and fewer deer. Some people, however, suspected that there were fewer deer because the hunters had increased to the point where they outnumbered the deer.

After some months observing the animals,16 Mowat discovered that when the caribous migrate for the hot season the wolves eat mice. Even if he collected some empirical proof in the feces, these empirical proofs would support only the idea that, sometimes, some wolves eat some mice, not the hypothesis that they survive on them for a good part of the year.

It is not empathy, nor a mere romantic dream of being a wolf — look again at the recipe: It is a technical device. The body is the witness. It will be the experimental group and the control group: At the end of each period, Mowat would run a series of physiological tests and compare the two sets of results. It is an experiment that leads to something rather unusual: Experiencing or sharing the inner life of a wolf receives here an unusual meaning and rather odd, for us, contemporary western psychological subjects: This is the beginning of a companion story, cum panis, the ones with whom we share food Haraway, The same food, even if not at the same table in this case, and for an experimental aim.

Most ethologists and primatologists are faced with this problem, though they hardly mention it in their reports: I encountered, in my readings, two motives for these worries. The other motive, much rarer, takes the form of cautious politeness: We will come to that point later.

Most often animals are simply submitted to human biological constraints. As pharmacologist Michael Chance pointed out, research with rats, for example, is carried out during daytime hours, which is the most convenient time for researchers, though, as it happens, it is the middle of the night for the rats: In better cases, the laboratory at least takes care to apply reverse lighting procedures.

However, in both cases, the animal is the one who adapts or tries to. Wolves are, in this respect, particularly problematic for human scientists. During the day, Mowat remarked, he observed that the female and the pups in the group were active, while the hunters two males rested in short naps of 10 minutes duration. During the night the males embarked on their own activities.

For fear of missing something vital, Mowat prevented himself from sleeping. After a few days, he reached the limits of his endurance. The solution came from the animals: Mowat failed to wake up until several hours had passed. Since his arrival, several weeks earlier, he had encountered the wolves only twice, both times by pure chance.

The second time he saw them, however, they were entering a cave — probably their den, Mowat guesses. However, the next day when he returned to the site no wolves seemed to actually inhabit this cave. The esker remained deserted. At this critical junction none but the most self-assured of men. To say that I was chagrined to discover I was not alone would be an understatement; for sitting directly behind me, and not twenty yards away, were the missing wolves. Instead of which, outraged, he turned his back on the watching wolves and hurriedly did up his buttons.

The problem, he confesses, was that he was facing the question of who is watching whom. Who is watching whom: Derrida, in that story, says that he realized that his cat, his small female cat, was actually looking back at him one morning in his bathroom.

Derrida all the more felt that he was in the presence of someone who was seeing him naked. The shame of being naked is not about the cat, it is only about himself. And yet for sure, we may have the impression that the naked body is a pretext, a pre-text for more philosophy; a kind of blank screen, all the more so since reciprocal gazes do not lead Derrida to share sensualities — or to write about them — nor to discuss the choreography of the morning greeting ceremony.

Politeness The issue of nudity does not seem to be a major preoccupation for the scientists — some of them studying swimming animals in the wild confess, in private, that they mostly work naked.

However, the incident Farley Mowat describes is echoed in the practices of some scientists. The primatologist Shirley Strum mentions it in passing when she describes her daily routine with the baboons she observes.

However, the question she raises has practical, vital, and I would add ethical consequences, for her and for the baboons she works with. But the risk of missing something was worrying her more and more; she decided after a while that she could try to urinate while staying among the baboons.

She cautiously undressed, looking around. They were, she says, astonished by the noise. Nothing made them believe that she could be a baboon. Next time, she concluded, they would not even react. The story Strum tells us is linked to the second question I noted though only rarely in ethological and primatological literature, the polite question: Looking and looking back on this occasion occurs not only in the gaze of those who meet and learn to know each other: Maybe this time we might say that the empathy was on the side of the baboons.

Farley Mowat describes a situation that is apparently very similar. In other words, Mowat used his body to make the animals respond. He decided to pitch his tent near to it in order to observe them, day and night.

The wolves completely ignored him. Actually, wolves were regularly passing by the tent and never evinced the slightest interest in him. Being ignored to such an extent became more and more intolerable for Mowat as time passed. Therefore, Mowat planned to use this knowledge to make them at least recognize his existence.

This took most of the night and required, as he meticulously explains, frequent returns to the tent to consume quantities Despret 67 of tea. As usual, the animal ignored the tent and its human owner, until he passed by a marked bush: After a minute of complete indecision he backed away a few yards and sat down.

At this moment, Mowat became very worried: The wolf kept looking at him. Then the wolf slowly began a systematic tour of the area and carefully placed his own mark on each of the ones the human had marked. In fact, it is not only the conventions of writing that render this unlikely; it is the very codes of practice.

Smuts recalls that progress in habituation was painfully slow: Ignoring social cues, she learned, is far from neutral social behaviour. Smuts therefore had to learn to be polite, in the ethical, political, and epistemological senses of the word. She learned to respond, to acknowledge, to look back, perhaps to greet, as she says.

And, as she tells us, her own being was transformed: I was learning a whole new way of being in the world — the way of baboons. She explains that, having learned the way baboons express their emotions, motivations or intentions, she could respond to them in ways she picked up from them and be understood. Once out of the Land Rover, she observed the way Ray, an immigrant male, made his own approach to enter the troop. And she imitated him. One day Ray, positioning himself between Strum and two resident males, solicited her support in agonistic interaction with them.

Strum refused to cooperate, and she did it in the way the baboons taught her: It is to insist upon the fact that if we are to understand how scientists may talk about their animals and how they make them known, and if we are to elucidate how these animals gain new identities through the very practices, we would be better served if we told stories about these embodied encounters. As Annemarie Mol calls it: Bodies enact rather than perform as Mol also suggests , and considering them as enacting blurs the clear-cut divide between knowing subject and known object: This is not only an epistemological issue, it is a political one and an ontological one.

In attending to a praxiographic account of their work, and moreover through paying attention to the way they embody their work, I hope, for my part, that my own account has made these scientists more real, without diminishing or obscuring the reality of the animals that actively participate in the research process.

Empathy is a word that is very often recruited in these kinds of stories, especially when bodies are involved. It bears resonances with troublesome romantic meanings, magic or folk knowledge.

Nevertheless, I choose to keep it, but only as a tool, in order to give it other meanings, to complicate the situations where this word may be evoked. Empathy becomes multiple, as are bodies, as are encounters, as are animals who are the living actors of these encounters.

Bodies are articulating, and become articulated, in the asking and in its responses. To urinate in front of an animal may create what Anna Tsing calls frictions. It matters for them that it matters for their animals. Empathy, in this case, is not feeling what the other feels, it is rather making the body available for the response of another being. It is to make ourselves and them corresponding, in all the senses my Oxford dictionary gives: The empathy is not the same.

For their purpose is not alike either. She is neither trying to get knowledge — knowing for the sake of knowing — nor trying to get involved in the life of the animals she tries to identify with.

An emotion, according to James, is not what is felt, but what makes us feel. In other words, our feelings dispose our bodies, our bodies dispose our feelings. The actors, James says, all know this simple fact: He quotes psychologist Fechner: When the baboons gave dirty looks to the former, she had to learn to act with them, to leave room for them to resist her proposition or her presence.

Acting with them is not the result but the very condition of acting like them. Empathy makes us think with, and with the body. A last thought, to conclude: It is never given, even if it is a gift. But authenticity is not lost: Acknowledgements I am grateful to my colleague John Pearson for revising the last version of the manuscript and for his suggestions.

I also wish to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments, sound critiques, and warm encouragements. However true this may be, these kind of complaints are a loi du genre, whose aim is to claim that you can only suffer these hardships if you really love animals. I could recall here the famous Clever Hans, the German horse that performed extraordinary feats among others, Hans could solve arithmetical problems to which he gave the answer by knocking with his feet.

See Bernd Heinrich for the ravens, Zahavi and Zahavi for the babblers, Cynthia Moss for the elephants, and Thelma Rowell for the sheep — many others could be mentioned. Bruno Latour inspires much of my work dealing with scientists working with animals. For an example in the field of ethology and primatology see Latour 5. These words are not stated randomly, and the reference is meaningful. What, for Rosenthal, does the ideal of an automaton mean?

Let us refer to the etymology: She refused; the paper was, however, published. See for the recent change about the status of anecdotes Lucy Bates and Richard Byrne In the book, written by Carolyn Janice Cherryh, the people living on that planet do feel emotions, but they are never personal. However, it is hard for the human diplomat to notice it and to prevent himself from construing their behaviour in emotional-relational terms.

Moreover, Grandin probably has, like most people diagnosed with autism, excellent reasons for privileging the innate hypothesis for autism. I am not contesting this hypothesis here. This has equally to be understood in the most concrete and practical sense. Most of the time, Grandin is hired to implement a welfare audit; she checks the meatpacking industry for the way people treat animals.

Usually, in such cases, people use electric prods. This led the farm industry to raise new questions and to address animals differently: In other words, Grandin empowers the animals in the sense that she gives them the power to force human beings to transform their habits and to address them differently. To be honest, I should add that my interpretation raises some problems and is — deliberately — candidly optimistic. But I consider that part of my work as a philosopher is about disclosing promises and possibilities in reconstructing narratives with slight shifts that enable us to inherit, as politely and fruitfully as possible, from these experiences.

Bekoff writes that he is often asked why he concentrates on his companion dog, Jethro, when making general points about social play in canines. Thanks to an anonymous referee who duly reminded me that the notion of partial connections I quote in Haraway comes from her colleague and friend Marilyn Strathern to whom Haraway herself gave credit for the notion.

He was suspected of having invented a good part of the story. For some, he stayed only four weeks and not a few months, as he claimed in the field, for others, the whole story is a fiction; moreover, scientists claim today that wolves never eat mice, etc. I will not try to seek the truth.

Duane Quiatt criticizes the two primatologists: Methodological invention is employed to break down the barriers of cultural confinement. It is something that may be done or left undone. It is an intervention. It intervenes in the various available styles for describing practices. Epistemological normativity is prescriptive: The normativity of ethnographic descriptions is of a different kind.

It suggests what must be taken into account when it comes to appreciating practices. See Haraway , who insists upon the need to stop abandoning ourselves to the temptation of innocence. We should actually say the contrary: This theory has often been mistaken as strongly materialistic and problematic: In his Essays in Radical Empiricism, James resumes the problem with much more nuanced theories: We may say both, and both will be true. Because the emotional experience is a particular experience in which the world appears as nondivided yet between a subjective knowing subject and an objective world James, , Using anecdotes to investigate animal cognition.

Bekoff M and Allen C Cognitive ethology: Slayers, skeptics, and proponents. State University of New York Press, — Briggs J Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Daston L Intelligences: Columbia University Press, 37— Despret V The body we care for: Estep D and Hetts S Interactions, relationships, and bonds: The conceptual basis for scientist-animal relations. Cambridge University Press, 6— Haraway D Simians, Cyborgs and Women: Heinrich B Mind of the Raven.

James W Principles of Psychology, Vol. James W Essays in Radical Empiricism. Kirk R A Chance Observation: Ethology and the Recovery of Nature of the Laboratory Animals. Conference given at the seminar Animal Subjects under Observation. Max Planck Institute, Berlin, 10—12 July. Latour B A well articulated primatology: Reflections of a fellow traveler.

Models of Science, Gender and Society. University of Chicago Press, — Mol A The Body Multiple. Thirteen Years in the Life of an Elephant Family. University of Chicago Press. Quiatt D Silent partners? Observations on some systematic relations among observer perspective, theory, and behavior. Rowell T A few peculiar primates. University of Chicago Press, 57— Smuts B Sex and Friendship in Baboons.

Smuts B Embodied communication in non-human animals. Cambridge University Press, — Strum SC Almost Human. Tsing A Frictions: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Viveiros de Castro E Perspectival anthropology and the method of controlled equivocation. Vinciane Despret is a philosopher and a psychologist. Her doctoral thesis has been published in English: Ethnopsychology and Selfhood Other Press, Her latest book, Que diraient les animaux si.

Much attention to date has focused on how the Euro-American individuation of the human subject intensifies the asymmetries inculcated by these divisions.

This paper rehearses some of this literature but goes on to attend to how these divisions undercut understandings of sociality and limit social organization to interaction between persons.

Keywords animals, being-in-the-world, Haraway, humankind, partial connection, sociality, Strathern Corresponding author: Reproduced with the kind permission of the artist and the John Martin Gallery, http: Contrastingly, Latimer 79 my extension with animals in their landscape throws me into a world beyond myself; I am experiencing a world vibrant with aesthetic pleasure and connectivity.

Something happens in these early morning walks that changes the scale for me: In terms of the ordering of our worlds, we both have our identities punctualized by a demanding relation Munro, But what is it that happens precisely when we encounter someone we love? Do we encounter somebody, or is it animals that come to inhabit you, ideas that invade you, movements that move you, sounds that traverse you? And can these things be parted? It is far more complex than that.

Haraway and Gane, For example, being alongside can involve cooperating with one another, even working together, but not with the same materials and not necessarily to the same ends. For Strathern, conceptual and lived relations are co-constitutive. This said, it should be emphasized that relations have no intrinsic value in themselves: So the animal, like the female, is caught as that which is made Other from the human.

Indeed, unlike the female, which is typically seen as supplementary, the animal is often construed as an impediment to being human; animalism and animal-like traits are constituted as the very thing to overcome, harness, enhance or master in order to warrant claims to be fully human. For all this, it is also the case that the human cannot be thought without comparison to the animal. It is this relation — in all its asymmetry — that brings human exceptionalism into view.

It is the connection as much as the division that matters — as Foucault , for example, helps illuminate in his exegesis of how Descartes distinguishes madness and reason. The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

This is held to be consciousness, or mind. Secular ideas of human exceptionalism continue to be rooted in the idea that only humans can think and reason. As has been endlessly discussed, however, there is a fundamental problem with the Cartesian mind. Its very nature, reason, not only separates it from the physical world — the so-called ghost in the machine.

Reason also puts consciousness into a special relation of asymmetry with the physical. This is because all that is body and nature and animal is constituted as knowable by the mind. As Levinas suggests, this conceptual framing has formed the basis of a highly problematic ethical and political legacy. In all this it is not just the more obvious relations, like eating animals, that is at issue. As Miele , forthcoming; Higgin et al. An asymmetrical relation in which nature — including the animal out there in the world as well as the animal within — becomes open to intervention, enhancement, exploitation and mastery.

Here is Marx [] helping to express what is at the very heart of human exceptionalism: Life itself appears only as a means to life. The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.

He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being.

Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i. What Marx does not unpick, however, is the tautology that he is caught in: Contrastingly, thinking with the animal — including human animality — helps to raise to view some of the conditions of possibility for our problematic history, particularly with regard to the violence of Othering.

Amongst others, Elizabeth Grosz has helped show how femininity has been strongly associated historically with the physical, the body, nature, and animality. Imprisoned in a Nazi camp, Levinas asks: Are we not men? It is left to a dog, Bobby, to answer: What I want also to stress is that this labouring of the relation between the human and the animal is partly how civilizations are done.

This ontology, I suggest, is based not on division but on an ordering of relations that is caught in the mode of comparison between the human and the animal. Animals Within What I now go on to consider are ways out of the Euro-American mode of comparison through which relations between the human and the animal are ordered — ways that allow for a revaluing of the animal without the elevation of a human sovereign subjectivity.

A number of theorists have reworked the relation between the human and the animal by re-membering human carnality, and the animality of the human. In emphasizing the hidden of the animal within, Deleuze is associating animal with carnality but also with something that hunts and haunts, with a kind of violence.

The animal within is thus about some kind of rawness through which to escape the habitus: Because of this he, in a sense like Marx, maintains a division: What is the posthuman?

Think of it as a point of view characterised by the following assumptions. First, the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life. Second, the posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor side show.

Third, the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born. As Midgley suggests, there were many ways in which the human sciences, in the name of protecting human dignity, conspired with particular colonial values.

But to what extent do continuities and biological relatedness erode the asymmetrical relations of ordering in the mode of comparison between human and other animals discussed above? He is a trained zoologist, geneticist and evolutionary biologist, and has written about telomeres, the tails of chromosomes. He spends much of his free time doing what he calls citizen science: In particular, he tells me that sea squirts are close to us in evolutionary terms they share the same DNA , yet they do not share any of the same characteristics as humans in terms of behaviour Kipling, Kipling, email correspondence, Latimer 89 Figure 2.

A species of sea squirt. Reproduced with the kind permission of David Kipling. Thus biological relatedness between human and other kinds may point to overlap, but not in ways that presume identity. In her analysis of British kinship in Reproducing the Future, Marilyn Strathern c shows us how people, let alone non-humans, can be biologically near related but socially far and vice versa. Substance in common does not presuppose closeness or connection. While octopi may not reason, they are closer to the human because they are sentient and intelligent can think: Because of this, we empathize with it: To recapitulate the earlier argument, humanism works divisions — between the body nature, the material and consciousness the metaphysical , between self and other, between inside and outside, and between human and animal.

The new biology shows that while some species are more biologically related to humans than previously thought, biological relatedness does not presume social closeness. Eroding the Singularity of Divides The reasons for animals being folded into humanist ethics are complex. As has been discussed above, it is not so much to do with connectedness but with similitude: Inclusion in the fold of human sociality is thus imagined in ways through which animals have to become more and more human-like.

In all this the human—non-human animal issue is not just about biology. Attention to being-with as distinct from being-there brings back into play how human existence is always about being in relation.

As Latimer 91 Pyyhtinen helps remind us in his discussion of Simmel: Rather than going with Deleuze on becoming animal, and the multiplicity that follows from becoming animal, discussed above, she focuses on what happens when humans become-with another kind. Rather, what she is trying to get us to see is how sociality is a matter of becoming with other kinds, and that this kind of sociality needs to be admitted and cherished as ethical as well as being good politics.

Within this view, companion species are not dogs or rabbits — the usual way of categorizing domesticated animals. The partners do not precede their relating; all that is, is the fruit of becoming with: Companion species then, for Haraway, come into being through a way of interspecies relationality. In an echo of Bruno Latour , she is suggesting that we have never been human.

Here, I want to suggest that her idea of companion species enacts something endemic to contemporary versions of being human. Implicitly Haraway is not just arguing that the companion species is in a state of being-with, or even a process of becoming-with. Rather, at least in its better moments, this being-with produces and reproduces something that is greater than either.

Haraway is explicit about this in talking about her dog. Haraway with her dog — in agility training and competition — come into view as transcending the limits of singularities; indeed, they are enhanced.

What gets performed, at least for a moment, is about becoming better than one. There are two issues to be concerned about here. In joining in, is the dog Cayenne to some extent becoming more human than dog? Is the infolding we witness here a human concern, a translation of the dog into human interests competition, agility , particularly those of enhancement: For all my sympathy with Haraway, it is hard not to resist seeing that her hybrid remains a world that is made up of a sociality of two.

For me, it is a dyadic hybrid, whose parts become something other than they are Latimer 93 without becoming with the other. And, moreover, it is about being infolded, as an inward not an outward movement. Let me turn to the sculptures by the artist Olivia Musgrave to help exemplify my argument here. Olivia described herself as both Anglo-Irish and Greek, and as inheriting myths and traditions from both, including growing up in Ireland with and around horses.

I liked her ideas of inheritance, partly because it gets us out of the prism of the individual and helps illuminate the idea that we are only ever made up of the parts of others, discussed by me in an earlier paper about Frida Kahlo Latimer, Olivia has read this paper and is happy with my interpretation. To begin with, the women and the horses are unadorned: And this partial connectivity is made all the more sensual and intense by the nakedness of the horses and the nakedness of the women.

There is also a partial connection between the women. The women face each other and are clearly doing something that is very familiarly human — they are discoursing and gesturing to each other. These are horse-ways of being-with each other. And of course what we can see is that the horses and the women are alongside each other.

The women are no longer discoursing humans but disciplined riders, wrists arched and hands raised, working invisible reins. So here is a particular state of being-with, of Mitsein, a form of sociality that is not a collapsing into a hybrid; nor do the horses or the humans become each other. However, this kind of relation also depends on both attachments and detachments between humans and humans, humans and horses, and horses and horses that are impermanent and irreducible.

The horse is now not striding out, nor even nuzzling its companion, but is a comfortable and strong back support! Their pose is relaxed, composed and peaceful. And there is tension. It takes a moment to catch it, but it is there: Rather, the horse is, unlike the woman, partially poised for either rest or movement: This detail is an expression of tension between the Amazonian woman and the horse that gives us a moment not of hybridity but of partial connection, and of the tension in partial division.

This is a depiction of relations between horses and human that constitutes being alongside, in which each part remains partially connected but also partially divided. I want therefore to suggest that these sculptures perform a kind of dwelling in which the horses remain distinctively horse, and are only partially humanized, while the women are only partially inhabited by the horse — the women each have other concerns each other, home, a book, where they have just been or are about to go.

And further, each is also able at any moment to move on, to push away from each other, to disconnect and separate, and attach to other extensions. Critically, both horses and women are also faceless.

Rather, it is one of the ways that the sculptures help us to get away from the individualizing of persons, to celebrate a world of relations rather than subjects, however interactive. In place of the notion of hybridity, in line with what I suggested earlier, these sculptures not only represent connections; they preserve a sense of division. However, in so doing, to get us out of the mode of comparison, its involutions return its relations — which are always multiple and complex — inevitably to wholes, however complex and plural, a move all too familiar in the Western tradition Strathern, b.

In contrast, what I am elucidating is the extent to which relations involve aspects that are division-preserving as much as they may also dissolve or dispose of boundaries. Conclusions Reconsiderations of human—animal relations entail the enactment of an ontology of connectivity that is itself connected to and is helping to re-imagine relations between persons and nature — what Ross proposes as a new ethics of inclusion.

In contrast to Latour I am building on the idea that contemporary reconsiderations of the asymmetrical relation between the human and the animal are precisely enacting a new kind of ethical politics — one that brings all that is animal into the fold of humanism to help constitute a more ethically aware, conscious and conscientious social reality. Subsequently I pointed to how some of these newer conceptions can still perform some of the old asymmetries.

As such she helps us to see how companion species are not dogs or cats but composite beings, a species that comes into being through a way of becoming-with other kinds. To avoid instituting a new exceptionalism with the idea of a companion species, I have argued that we sometimes need to augment the notion of being-with with that of our being alongside.

Like Whatmore this issue , I am stressing the intermittency and partialness of connection and disconnection at the same time as I preserve a sense of more-than-human world-making. My aim has been to stress the possibility of dwelling with non-humans as preserving division and alterity as much as connectivity and unity Latimer 99 however plural.

This is of particular importance for those others who are at risk of exclusion because they are not included in the valorization of human—non-human hybrids and are invisible and neglected Puig de la Bellacasa, Rethinking animal and human relations is then as much to do — as Bell, cited earlier, argues — with attending to nature and with reconstituting humans as being as much a part of nature as any other creatures, however domesticated, tamed, exploited, acculturated and socialized.

Here, openness does not return us to the parts, the individual subjects and their subjectivities see, for example, Battaglia, , but to relations. What is being played out is something to do with recovering our groundedness in nature, and recognizing that any form of social life that simply debases the animal, and all those humans who have been and will continue to be animalized, is likely to be impoverished if not deeply — at root — ethically problematic.

Let me apologize in advance for this anthropomorphic and modernist trope. I am fully aware that horses may not have purposes, but I am human after all and only have my stories and my words! While I can try to think horse, there is no way out of the use of words to do it with. Agamben G and Attell K. Battaglia D Toward an ethics of the open subject: Writing culture in good conscience. Bauman Z Effacing the face: Carey J The politics of friends: Animals and deconstructive opportunity. Dwelling with animals after Levinas.

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Jordan T Troubling companions: Companion species and the politics of inter-relations. Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 19 4: Kipling D Genetics, evolutionary biology and human-animal relations. Latimer J Unsettling bodies: Latimer J Conclusions: Defacing horror, realigning nurses. Boundaries, Bodies and Health Work.

Latimer J b Rewriting bodies, portraiting persons? The gene, the clinic and the figure of the human. Latimer J and Munro R Driving the social.

The Sociological Review, 54 s1: Relational extension, the idea of home, and otherness. Space and Culture 12 3: The Sociological Review, 59 3: Levinas E The name of a dog, or natural rights.

Essays on Judaism, trans. The Athlone Press, —3. Originally published in Celui qui ne peut pas se servir des mots, Montpellier: Manning A and Serpell J Introduction. Marx K [] Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: Melley T A terminal case: William Burroughs and the logic of addiction. Cultural Studies in Addiction.

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